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How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current 
 Clergy-Penitent Privilege Through a Comparison 
with the Attorney-Client Privilege 
In 1813, a New York court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause 
prohibited the state from compelling a Catholic priest to disclose in-
formation learned in a confidential confession.1 This decision to pre-
serve the clergy-penitent privilege2 on constitutional grounds3 is the 
central feature of one of the great stories concerning church and 
state in America. Daniel Phillips had knowingly received stolen 
goods.4 Following the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, Phillips 
confessed to Father Kohlman. Determined to right the wrong, Phil-
lips later delivered the goods to Father Kohlman who then returned 
them to the original owner. Apprised of these events by the original 
owner, the state subpoenaed Father Kohlman to testify regarding 
Phillips before a grand jury. To prevent Father Kohlman from being 
forced to choose between an obligation to God and an obligation to 
the state, the Phillips court ruled that “[t]he only course is, for the 
court to declare that he shall not testify or act at all.”5 This conflict 
 
 1. People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813) was not officially published. The case is 
abstracted at Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 W. L.J. 109 (1843) [hereinafter 
Privileged Communications to Clergymen I], and at Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 
CATH. LAW. 199 (1955) [Privileged Communications to Clergymen II]. Although more diffi-
cult to encounter, the complete unofficial report from which the above abstracts were drawn 
was published as WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (Da Capo Press 
1974) (1813). 
 2. Although the phrase “privilege protecting confidential communications with clergy” 
is more legally correct (acknowledging that the privilege must protect confidential communica-
tions with clergy in a way that does not favor one religion over another to avoid Establishment 
Clause problems), this Comment shall use the less burdensome “clergy-penitent privilege” for 
the sake of consistency with existing scholarship. 
 3. See People v. Phillips, (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813) at 112–13; Privileged Communi-
cations to Clergymen, supra note 1, at 207 (“Suppose that a decision of this court, or a law of 
the state should prevent the administration of [a basic Protestant sacrament] . . . , would not 
the constitution be violated, and the freedom of religion be infringed? Every man who hears 
me will answer in the affirmative. Will not the same result follow, if we deprive the Roman 
[C]atholic of one of his ordinances?”). 
 4. See SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 4–5. The brief summary of the facts provided here is 
taken entirely from Sampson. 
 5. See Privileged Communications to Clergymen II, supra note 1, at 203; see also Privi-
leged Communications to Clergymen I, supra note 1, at 112. 
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between the state’s coercive power to collect evidence and the right 
to maintain confidential certain religious communications lies at the 
center of every challenge to the clergy-penitent privilege. The hold-
ing in People v. Phillips is significant because it reflects an important 
early understanding of the phrase “free exercise of religion.” The es-
sential aspect of this understanding was that the First Amendment 
guaranteed state accommodation of religious behavior that may not 
conform to generally applicable law.6 A second legal basis that the 
Phillips court could have relied on is also important. If understood as 
a structural restraint on governmental power, the Establishment 
Clause also could have required the Phillips court to prevent state in-
terference with Father Kohlman’s confidential communications.7 
Although Phillips represents a triumphant early moment for reli-
gious freedom in America, its influence has been limited. The Su-
preme Court has not decided whether either of the First Amend-
ment religion clauses requires maintenance of the clergy-penitent 
privilege. Still, confidential communications with clergy have gener-
ally been protected under state law, much like the attorney-client 
privilege.8 However, as all fifty states have enacted mandatory abuse-
reporting laws,9 the status of such privileges has been called into 
question. The seriousness of a single incident of child abuse is un-
questionable; national child abuse rates10 are therefore a cause for 
great concern. Unfortunately, concern over child abuse has fueled an 
attempt to undermine the clergy-penitent privilege. To justify their 
assault on a basic religious freedom, those who advocate abrogation 
of the clergy-penitent privilege imply that policy-makers must choose 
either to uphold the clergy-penitent privilege or effectively combat 
 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins 
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).  
 7. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment 
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 8. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 72–77 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 
1999); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE ch. 5 (1999). 
 9. For a summary of the several states’ abuse-reporting laws, see National Clearing-
house on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, Overview of Child Abuse and Neglect State 
Statute Elements, Reporting Statutes, at http://www.calib.com/nccanch/statutes/index.cfm 
#Laws (Jan. 31, 2002). 
 10. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimated that 270,000 chil-
dren were victims of physical or sexual abuse in 1999. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, ADMIN. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1999: REPORTS 
FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM ch. 2.2 
(2001). 
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child abuse.11 Framing the issue in such terms is an attempt to lever-
age the appropriate emotional response to a vile crime like child 
abuse against a religious liberty interest that may seem less urgent. 
Still, one can fully condemn child abuse while defending the 
clergy-penitent privilege. However persuasive it may be, the binary 
approach suggesting that one must either choose between the privi-
lege or child abuse prevention is simplistic and ultimately flawed. 
First, such an approach implies that, compared to the state, clergy 
are unconcerned when it comes to child abuse prevention. Contrary 
to this implication—and despite the rare case involving an abusive 
clergy member12—it seems reasonable to assume that both clergy 
and the state are deeply concerned about the well-being of children. 
Second, this approach proposes a probable non-solution: abrogation 
of the clergy-penitent privilege is not likely to diminish child abuse.13 
Third, adopting this approach ignores the fact that alternative means, 
such as traditional law enforcement methods and less controversial 
reporting requirements, remain intact to enforce child abuse laws.14 
Finally, the claim that one must choose between the clergy-penitent 
privilege and child abuse prevention fails to acknowledge that clergy-
penitent communication may effectively combat child abuse.15 
Considering these points—and the religious significance of the 
practice of confidential confession16—abrogation of the clergy-
penitent privilege through abuse-reporting laws should be a cause for 
great concern. 
Drawing a comparison between the clergy-penitent and attorney-
client privileges, this Comment will demonstrate that if anything, the 
clergy-penitent privilege merits more protection from abrogation 
than the attorney-client privilege. Part I of this Comment will sum-
 
 11. See, e.g., Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will it Save Our Children?, 
28 SETON HALL L. REV. 963, 998–99 (1998) (assuming a significant conflict between eviden-
tiary privileges and child abuse prevention, and concluding that abrogation of privileges is nec-
essary to prevent child abuse). 
 12. Accounts of abusive clergy members are far too common. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, 
Two Priests Who Abused Boys in Maine Are Removed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, § 1, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/10/national/10PRIE.html. Still, this Comment 
assumes that such predators are relatively uncommon in relation to the many thousands of 
clergy members of every religion who live up to the high standards they teach. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 105–07. 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 104 and 171. 
 15. See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 70–76 and 185. 
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marize current state laws regarding mandatory abuse-reporting and 
compare the effect these laws have had on the clergy-penitent and 
attorney-client privileges. Part II of this Comment will analyze the 
clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges in relation to the tradi-
tional rationales for evidentiary privileges to assess whether the cur-
rent difference in status between the two privileges relates to a differ-
ence in value or importance. Part III will analyze the clergy-penitent 
and attorney-client privileges’ respective claims to protection under 
the Constitution. Finally, Part IV will look beyond the traditional ra-
tionales and constitutional arguments to consider some alternative 
explanations for the current difference in status between the clergy-
penitent and attorney-client privileges. 
I. THE EFFECT OF ABUSE-REPORTING LAWS 
While child abuse is not a new problem, taking child abuse seri-
ously may be considered relatively new.17 The Children’s Bureau of 
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
promulgated the first model abuse-reporting laws in 1963.18 By 
1967, all fifty states had adopted abuse-reporting laws.19 These laws 
were initially narrow in scope, requiring only physicians to report 
suspected child abuse.20 However, as the federal government offered 
grants to states that enacted more expansive abuse-reporting laws,21 
most states enacted expansive laws to qualify themselves for the fed-
eral funds. The stated purpose for abuse-reporting laws is to protect 
children from the harm associated with child abuse.22 Abuse-
reporting laws generally impose both a duty to report and criminal 
penalties or potential civil liability on those who fail to comply. 
 
 17. See Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements 
Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 726 (1987). 
 18. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, THE 
ABUSED CHILD: PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING 
OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963). 
 19. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 727. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 
(1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5107 (1995)). 
 22. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101 (Lexis 2001) (imposing duty to report 
to “protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and 
neglect”). Professor Mitchell observes that every state’s abuse-reporting law is based on the 
same objective. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 725 (“Every state has a statute aimed at discov-
ering and stopping child abuse.”) (footnote omitted). 
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Despite some basic similarities, significant variation between the 
abuse-reporting laws of the several states raises a variety of con-
cerns.23 One of the more troublesome problems with abuse-
reporting laws is vague language. Of the fifty-one statutes under con-
sideration, eighteen name any “individual,” “person,” or “other per-
son” as a mandatory reporter.24 Using such universal language with-
out specific guidance as to its effect on preexisting law, many abuse-
reporting laws leave considerable uncertainty as to their intended ef-
fect on evidentiary privileges.25 Still, a significant number of report-
ing laws are clear about their effect on otherwise privileged commu-
nications regarding abuse.26 
A. Reporting Laws and the Clergy-Penitent Privilege 
The effect on the clergy-penitent privilege achieved by the statu-
tory schemes of the several states may be considered in four basic 
categories: (1) complete abrogation; (2) conditional preservation; 
(3) complete preservation; and (4) uncertain. Statutes enacted in 
nine states achieve a complete abrogation of the clergy-penitent 
privilege in relation to the duty to report suspected abuse.27 Statutes 
enacted in eighteen states have imposed a conditional duty to report 
 
 23. Such concerns involve various attempts to define clergy, ambiguity regarding 
whether one or both parties to a privileged communication may invoke the privilege, and con-
stitutionally questionable attempts to limit or extend the privilege. 
 24. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (Lexis 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (Lexis 
2000); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619(a) (Lexis 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (Lexis 2000); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030(1) (Lexis 2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704(a)(1) 
(Lexis 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Lexis 2001); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-
711(1) (Lexis 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (Lexis 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
9:6-8.10 (Lexis 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3(A) (Lexis 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-
301 (Lexis 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (A)(1) (Lexis 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
40-11-3(a) (Lexis 2001); Act of June 7, 2001, sec. 1, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 351 (to be codi-
fied at TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(a) (Lexis 2000); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403(1) (Lexis 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205(a) (Lexis 
2001). 
 25. See infra notes 30 and 37 and accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 27. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-101, -103 (Lexis 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
43-21-353 (Lexis 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-C:29, -C:32 (Lexis 2000); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-301, -310 (Lexis 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7103, 7113 (Lexis 
2000); R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 40-11-3, -11 (Lexis 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-411 (Lexis 
2001); Act of June 7, 2001, sec. 1, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 351 (to be codified at TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 37-1-403); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Lexis 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
49-6A-2, 7 (Lexis 2001).  
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abuse subject to a clergy-penitent privilege limited by various 
terms.28 Statutes enacted in four states specifically preserve the 
clergy-penitent privilege without express limits.29 Since their statutes 
do not name clergy as reporters nor comment on the effect of a 
broad duty to report, the status of the clergy-penitent privilege in re-
lation to abuse reporting is uncertain in the remaining nineteen 
states and the District of Columbia.30 In some of these states the 
strength of the clergy-penitent privilege presumably allows clergy to 
refrain from reporting child abuse.31 On the other hand, the strength 
of the language found in the abuse-reporting statutes of other states  
 
 28. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-805, 13-3620 (Lexis 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 
11165.7, 11166 (Lexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.201, .204 (Lexis 2000); IDAHO CODE 
§§ 16-1619, -1620 (Lexis 2000); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-11-1, 31-33-5-1, -2 (Lexis 
2000); LA. CODE OF JUV. PROC. ANN. art. 603(13), 609(A)(1), 610(F) (Lexis 2000); Act of 
June 1, 2001, sec. 5, 2001 Me. Laws 345 (Lexis) (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 4011); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-704, -705 (Lexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
626.556 (Lexis 2000); Act of April 1, 2001, sec. 4, 2001 Mont. Laws 311 (Lexis) (to be codi-
fied at MONT. CODE. ANN. § 41-3-201); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-711, -714 (Lexis 
2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432B.220, .250 (Lexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.10 
(Lexis 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (Lexis 2001); Act of April 23, 2001, sec. 148, 
2001 Ore. HB 2609 (Lexis) (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT.  § 419B.005); Act of April 23, 
2001, sec. 149, 2001 Ore. HB 2609 (Lexis) (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT.  § 419B.010); 
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (Lexis 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2001); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-205, -210 (Lexis 2001).  
 29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (Lexis 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
620.050(2) (Lexis 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-550 (Lexis 2000); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 26.44.060(3) (Lexis 2001). 
 30. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-10, 26-14-3 (Lexis 2001); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.020, 
.060 (Lexis 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (Lexis 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
19-3-304, -311 (Lexis 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1321.02, .05 (Lexis 2001); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 19-7-5 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-1.1, 350-5 (Lexis 2000); 325 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (Lexis 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.74 (Lexis 2001); Act of May 
7, 2001, §§ 1-2, 2001 Ia. HF 680 (Lexis) (to be codified at IOWA CODE. § 232.69); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (Lexis 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51A, 51B (Lexis 
2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.623, .631 (Lexis 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
210.115, .140, 568.110 (Lexis 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-4-3(A), -5(A) (Lexis 2001); 
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (Lexis 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Anderson 
2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-3, -15 (Lexis 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 
(Lexis 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.3, 11 (Lexis 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 
(Lexis 2000). 
 31. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (Lexis 2001) (“Unless the person confessing or con-
fiding waives the privilege, a clergyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited 
Christian Science practitioner, shall not be allowed [to] disclose a confession or confidence 
made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor.”). 
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in the uncertain category may suggest that abrogation was in-
tended.32 
B. Reporting Laws and the Attorney-Client Privilege 
The effect on the attorney-client privilege achieved by the statu-
tory schemes of the several states may be considered in the same four 
categories employed above: (1) complete abrogation; (2) conditional 
preservation; (3) complete preservation; and (4) uncertain. Only two 
states seem to have abrogated the attorney-client privilege whenever 
it would conflict with a duty to report.33 Three other states impose a 
duty to report only when that knowledge is obtained outside of the 
attorney-client relationship.34 Seventeen states have expressly pre-
served the attorney-client privilege.35 Of these, eight states have pre-
served the attorney-client privilege exclusively while apparently abro-
gating all other privileges.36 Due to ambiguous statutory language, 
the effect of abuse-reporting statutes on the attorney-client privilege 
is uncertain in the remaining twenty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia.37 However, the attorney-client privilege is customarily 
 
 32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-3, -10 (Lexis 2001).  
 33. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Lexis 2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
261.101 (Lexis 2000).  
 34. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220 (Lexis 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2151.421(A)(2) (Anderson 2001); Act of April 23, 2001, sec. 149, 2001 Ore. HB 2609 
(Lexis) (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419.010). 
 35. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (Lexis 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-805(B) 
(Lexis 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (Lexis 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (Lexis 
2000); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (Lexis 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(2) (Lexis 
2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-705(a)(2) (Lexis 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
722.631 (Lexis 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Lexis 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
169-C:32 (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (Lexis 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-
25.1-10 (Lexis 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (Lexis 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
550 (Lexis 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060(3) (Lexis 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-6A-7 (Lexis 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210 (Lexis 2001). 
 36. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (Lexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (Lexis 2000); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.631 (Lexis 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Lexis 2000); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (Lexis 2000); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (Lexis 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-7 (Lexis 2001). 
 37. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.020, .060 (Lexis 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 
(Lexis 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166 (Lexis 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 19-3-304, -311 (Lexis 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-101, -103 (Lexis 2001); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1321.02, .05 (Lexis 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (Lexis 2000); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-1.1, 350-5 (Lexis 2000); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 
(Lexis 2001); 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/11-20.2 (Lexis 2001); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-
32-11-1, 31-33-5-1, -2 (Lexis 2000); Act of May 7, 2001, §§ 1-2, 2001 Ia. HF 680 (Lexis) 
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strong in many of the “uncertain” states.38 In fact, Professor 
Mosteller has argued that state legislatures did not intend to abro-
gate the attorney-client privilege through abuse-reporting laws.39 
Considering Mosteller’s argument, the strength of the attorney-
client privilege in many states, and the lack of reference to attorneys 
in many abuse-reporting laws, there appears to be a strong presump-
tion that abuse-reporting laws do not abrogate the attorney-client 
privilege.40 
C. Attorneys Protected, Clergy Neglected 
Summarizing the preceding discussion, the following table facili-
tates comparison of the effect that abuse-reporting laws have had on 
the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privileges. 
 
(to be codified at IOWA CODE § 232.69); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.74 (Lexis 2001); LA. 
CODE OF JUV. PROC. ANN. art. 603(13), 609(A)(1), 610(F) (Lexis 2000); Act of June 1, 
2001, sec. 5, 2001 Me. Laws 345 (Lexis) (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 
4011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51A, 51B (Lexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
626.556 (Lexis 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Lexis 2001); Act of April 1, 2001, 
sec. 4, 2001 Mont. Laws 311 (Lexis) (to be codified at MONT. CODE. ANN. §41-3-201); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-711, -714 (Lexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (Lexis 
2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-4-3(A), 5(A) (Lexis 2001); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 
(Lexis 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7103, 7113 (Lexis 2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 6311 (Lexis 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-3, -15 (Lexis 2001); Act of June 
7, 2001, sec. 1, 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 351 (to be codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-411 (Lexis 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (Lexis 2001); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (Lexis 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.3, .11 (Lexis 
2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Lexis 2000). 
 38. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-9-21 (Lexis 2001) (providing broad privilege for 
“communications between attorney and client”). 
 39. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confi-
dences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 223–24 (1992). 
Mosteller argues that expansions of the attorney-client privilege to legislative and administra-
tive proceedings and the principle that “an attorney may not defeat the privilege indirectly by 
transmitting a statement regarding a client’s confidential communication through a third 
party,” suggest that the attorney-client privilege maintains client communications confidential 
despite abuse-reporting laws. Id. at 228–29. 
 40. See id. at 273 (concluding that “with the possible exception of one state, the legisla-
tion does not indicate any intention to abrogate the attorney-client privilege as it has been his-
torically interpreted”) (footnotes omitted). 
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 Attorney-Client 
Privilege 
Clergy-Penitent 
Privilege 
Privilege Abrogated 2 9 
Partial Abrogation 3 18 
Privilege Maintained 17 4 
Uncertain 28 + DC 19 + DC 
 
In light of how many states have sought to protect or abrogate 
the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges, the manner and ex-
tent of the abuse-reporting laws’ unequal effect on these privileges 
becomes readily apparent. Perhaps most striking is the number of 
states that have expressly preserved the privileges. While seventeen 
states have preserved the attorney-client privilege without additional 
limits,41 only four states have preserved the clergy-penitent privilege 
without imposing additional limits.42 This difference in protection 
presumably reflects a significant amount of concern in state legisla-
tures for the attorney-client privilege and relatively little concern for 
the preservation of the clergy-penitent privilege. Also notable is the 
difference between the abuse-reporting laws that partially abrogate 
the privileges at hand. Eighteen states limit the clergy-penitent privi-
lege to various degrees while claiming to preserve it.43 In contrast, 
three of the four states that name attorneys as mandatory reporters 
preserve the confidentiality of communications with clients.44 In 
other words, these three states impose an essentially meaningless 
duty on attorneys to report, since it only applies to information not 
obtained from clients. 
The number of states that have abrogated the attorney-client and 
clergy-penitent privileges is also significant. While abuse-reporting 
laws apparently abrogated the clergy-penitent privilege in nine 
states,45 the attorney-client privilege has been abrogated in only two 
states.46 It is notable that the two states (Mississippi and Texas) that 
abrogated the attorney-client privilege are among the states that also 
 
 41. See supra note 35. 
 42. See supra note 29. 
 43. See supra note 28. 
 44. See supra note 34. 
 45. See supra note 27. 
 46. See supra note 33. 
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abrogated the clergy-penitent privilege.47 Assuming that both the at-
torney-client and clergy-penitent privileges merit continued exis-
tence, the Texas and Mississippi abuse-reporting laws are the worst 
conceived of all. For what it is worth, however, the Texas and Missis-
sippi abuse-reporting laws at least appear even-handed.48 The 
remaining seven states that abrogated the clergy-penitent privilege 
have done so while simultaneously preserving the attorney-client 
privilege.49 In contrast, no state has expressly preserved the clergy-
penitent privilege while abrogating the attorney-client privilege. This 
difference in the number of states abrogating the attorney-client and 
clergy-penitent privileges represents a particular assault on the clergy-
penitent privilege. 
The numbers involved in these three points of comparison obvi-
ously represent only a small part of the total number of states. It is 
important to bear in mind that the abuse-reporting laws in twenty-
nine states are unclear as to how they affect the attorney-client privi-
lege,50 while the abuse-reporting laws in nineteen states are unclear 
as to how they affect the clergy-penitent privilege.51 Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to view the reporting laws that actually define how 
they affect the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privileges as an in-
dication of how unclear abuse-reporting laws are likely to be under-
stood to affect evidentiary privileges in the future. 
Disparate treatment of the attorney-client and clergy-penitent 
privileges in relation to abuse-reporting laws is also apparent when 
examining current statutory schemes of individual states. The eight 
states that preserve only the attorney-client privilege52 provide per-
haps the most striking example of such divergent treatment. The 
 
 47. See supra notes 27 and 33. 
 48. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(c) (Lexis 2000) (“The requirement to report 
under this section applies without exception to an individual whose personal communications 
may otherwise be privileged, including an attorney, a member of the clergy. . . .”); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Lexis 2001). 
 49. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-101, -103 (Lexis 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 169-C:29, C:32 (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-301, -310 (Lexis 2000); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7103, 7113 (Lexis 2000); R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 40-11-3, -11 
(Lexis 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-411 (Lexis 2001); Act of June 7, 2001, sec. 1, 2001 
Tenn. Pub. Acts 351 (to be codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 49-6A-2, -7 (Lexis 2001). 
 50. See supra note 30. 
 51. See supra note 37. 
 52. See supra note 36. 
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statutory schemes of these states vary by the means in which they 
treat differently the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges. 
Statutes enacted in Alabama, Michigan, and Missouri specifically ab-
rogate some privileges while expressly preserving only the attorney-
client privilege.53 Such a failure to deal with the clergy-penitent privi-
lege in either a negative or positive manner while addressing other 
privileges seems to reflect indifference toward the clergy-penitent 
privilege. Statutes enacted in Florida, North Carolina, and Rhode Is-
land impose a universal duty to report that exclusively preserves the 
attorney-client privilege.54 Such a scheme seems to suggest particular 
concern for the attorney-client privilege and general indifference to-
ward all other privileges. Statutes enacted in New Hampshire and 
West Virginia name clergy as mandatory reporters while preserving 
exclusively the attorney-client privilege.55 These states seem to have 
made the policy judgment in unambiguous terms that the attorney-
client privilege merits protection while the clergy-penitent privilege 
(among others) does not. Consideration of the legislative history be-
hind these statutory schemes would presumably lend support to the 
preceding inferences regarding the policy judgments underlying 
these statutes; such a study, however, is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. At this point, it is sufficient to demonstrate that a signifi-
cant number of state legislatures have simultaneously preserved the 
attorney-client privilege and destroyed the clergy-penitent privilege 
in relation to abuse-reporting laws. 
II. KEEPING WITH TRADITIONAL RATIONALES 
Evidentiary privileges were initially justified as a means of 
preserving the honor of those entrusted with confidential 
communications.56 The honor justification was abandoned relatively 
early, and in no uncertain terms.57 A utilitarian justification for 
 
 53. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (Lexis 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.631 
(Lexis 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Lexis 2000). 
 54. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (Lexis 
2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (Lexis 2001). 
 55. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (Lexis 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-
7 (Lexis 2001). 
 56. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2286 (John 
T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (“In the trials of the 1600s, the obligations of honor among 
gentlemen . . . were often put forward as a sufficient ground for maintaining silence.”). 
 57. See id. § 2286 n.16 (quoting Hill’s Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 1362 (1777)) (“[I]f this 
point of honour was to be so sacred . . . the most atrocious criminals would every day escape 
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evidentiary privileges has been more significant and lasting than the 
honor justification.58 Authors have also articulated a rights-based jus-
tification claiming that evidentiary privileges are required by concep-
tions of privacy or autonomy.59 The following analysis will refer to 
the utilitarian and privacy or autonomy-based justifications to assess 
whether the current difference in status of the clergy-penitent and 
attorney-client privileges may be attributed to valid judgments re-
garding their underlying value. 
A. Confidentiality and Maximization 
Professor John H. Wigmore defined the utilitarian justification 
for evidentiary privileges in his influential treatise on evidence.60 Ac-
cording to Wigmore, consideration of evidentiary privileges should 
“start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to 
give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions 
which may exist are distinctly exceptional.”61 Therefore, Wigmore ar-
gued, individuals may refuse to produce evidence only “when the 
benefit gained by exacting [evidence] would in general be less valu-
able than the disadvantage caused.”62 In Trammel v. United States,63 
the Supreme Court acknowledged these basic premises for the utili-
tarian justification of evidentiary privileges.64 In Trammel, a utilitar-
ian analysis led the Court to limit the right to withhold evidence un-
der the spousal privilege to the witness-spouse.65 State courts have 
likewise acknowledged the underlying basis of the utilitarian justifica-
tion, and have generally sought to limit the application of most privi-
 
punishment; and therefore it is that the wisdom of the law knows nothing of that point of 
honour.”). 
 58. See infra Part III.A. 
 59. See infra Part III.B. 
 60. See WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2192. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
 64. Id. at 50 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting)) (stating privileges “must be strictly construed and accepted ‘only to the very 
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public 
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascer-
taining truth’”). 
 65. Id. at 52–53. The Court reasoned that “[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify 
against the other in a criminal proceeding,” the social benefit that the privilege was meant to 
preserve (“marital harmony”) is probably already beyond preservation. Id. at 52. 
BAI-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
489] How Secrets Are Kept 
 501 
leges.66 Wigmore argued that an evidentiary privilege should only be 
recognized under the utilitarian justification if the following four 
prerequisites were met: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one in which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of 
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.67 
Rather than consider the cost imposed on particular individuals 
before a court in litigation, Wigmore intended the fourth criteria to 
entail a balancing analysis between the overall benefit derived from 
the preservation of confidential communications against the overall 
cost of maintaining a privilege to the legal system.68 Although this 
analysis has been criticized as blind to individual concerns, it has also 
been praised for striking a balance between society’s long-term inter-
est in the discovery of evidence and the interests supporting the 
maintenance of evidentiary privileges.69 The following analysis will 
focus on the costs and benefits related to the clergy-penitent and at-
torney-client privileges in the terms of Wigmore’s four criteria. 
1. Utility and the clergy-penitent privilege 
a. Confidentiality. An expectation of confidentiality accompanies 
communications between clergy and those who confess or seek simi-
lar counseling. In some cases, this expectation is reinforced by strict 
church-imposed confidentiality rules. The rules governing the Seal of 
the Confession found in the Catholic Code of Cannon Law provide 
 
 66. See Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 641 (Wash. 2001); People v. Hamacher, 
438 N.W.2d 43, 56–57 (Mich. 1989) (Boyle, J., dissenting). 
 67. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2285 (citation omitted). 
 68. See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 
1473 (1985) [hereinafter Developments]. 
 69. Id. at 1473–74. 
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one example. According to cannon law, “The Sacramental seal is in-
violable. Accordingly, it is absolutely wrong for a confessor in any 
way to betray the penitent, for any reason whatsoever, whether by 
word or in any other fashion.”70 The 1917 Code provided that the 
confessor was to “diligently take care” not to betray the penitent.71 
However, the 1983 revised Code of Cannon Law reflects increased 
emphasis on confidentiality, providing that “it is absolutely wrong 
for a confessor in any way to betray the penitent.”72 Furthermore, 
the Code of Cannon Law provides that “[a] confessor who directly 
violates the sacramental seal incurs [an automatic] excommunication 
reserved to the Apostolic See; he who does so only indirectly is to be 
punished according to the gravity of the offense.”73 Another example 
of such confidentiality rules comes from The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints (“LDS Church”). Confession of serious sins in 
confidential interviews is a central requirement of the LDS Church.74 
Confession may alert church authorities that disciplinary action, such 
as excommunication, is necessary.75 “The bishop is expected to keep 
confidential the confession of the transgressor” according to LDS 
Church policy.76 
Adherents to a religion that has not devised strict confidentiality 
rules may also seek private spiritual counsel “in a confidence that 
[what they say] will not be disclosed.”77 Such an individual is likely 
to expect that discussion of personal problems with a religious au-
thority is completely confidential. Furthermore, many different as-
pects of such a discussion would tend to confirm this expectation of 
privacy. Confirmation of an expectation of privacy might come from 
communication in a private location, assurances of confidentiality, or 
 
 70. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1. 
 71. 1917 CODE c.889, §§ 1–2. 
 72. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1. 
 73. 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1. For additional discussion of the Seal of the Confession, see 
Raymond C. O’Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandat-
ing That Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (1991). 
 74. See SPENCER W. KIMBALL, THE MIRACLE OF FORGIVENESS 179 (3d ed. 1993). 
“The confession of . . . major sins to a proper Church authority is one of those requirements 
made by the Lord. . . . This procedure of confession assures proper controls and protection for 
the Church and its people and sets the feet of the transgressor on the path of true repentance.” 
Id. 
 75. See id. at 325 (discussing duty of certain authorized church leaders to initiate official 
action “in cases which warrant either disfellowshipment or excommunication”). 
 76. Id. at 334. 
 77. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2285; see also supra text accompanying note 67.  
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the absence of a warning that the communications are not confiden-
tial.78 Where church-imposed rules of confidentiality do not apply, 
the analysis may require additional factual consideration on a case-
by-case basis. Concerned that such a system would be abused, some 
states have determined that the clergy-penitent privilege does not 
apply to communications made outside of a formal confessional or 
similar confidential spiritual counseling. This policy implicitly ex-
cludes communications made in the company of third persons or 
clergy observations made in a non-confidential setting.79 While some 
may go too far, such limitations may be necessary to ensure that the 
clergy-penitent privilege does not provide undue protection to crimi-
nals. 
b. Is confidentiality essential? Confidentiality is “essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation”80 between clergy 
and penitent. First, fear that a clergy member may be compelled to 
reveal the content of confidential communications would be a sig-
nificant deterrent to those seeking to confess sins or receive similar 
spiritual counseling.81 Since shame and fear already function as sig-
nificant internal deterrents to the potential penitent, fear that com-
munications with clergy would not remain confidential is particularly 
likely to deter spiritual counseling. If fear of non-confidentiality 
causes would-be penitents to completely avoid spiritual counseling, 
the clergy-penitent relation is obviously damaged. Furthermore, laws 
that interfere with the clergy-penitent privilege force clergy members 
to choose between loyalty to God and the state.82 While this choice 
may cause some clergy members to violate spiritual laws, the quality 
of devotion that leads to a life of religious service is more likely to 
 
 78. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1475. 
 79. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (Lexis 2001) (“No minister of the gospel, 
or priest of any denomination whatsoever, or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner, 
shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the 
course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination.”); see also Mitchell, 
supra note 17, at 747–55. 
 80. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 81. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 812 (“If, to comply with statutory reporting re-
quirements, clergy begin to disclose otherwise confidential information, the expectation of se-
crecy will be destroyed. In the short run, confiders will feel betrayed; in the long run, they are 
likely to stop confiding in the clergy.”). 
 82. See Lennard K. Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: Its Constitutionality and 
Doctrine, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 145, 168 (2000) (“There are laws that some people believe 
are greater than the state. Such is the situation with the Catholic priest threatened with auto-
matic excommunication if he violates the confessional seal.”). 
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lead clergy members to choose God over the state. If such defiance 
leads to the imprisonment of the clergy member,83 the clergy-
penitent relationship would obviously be degraded. 
Claims that people generally seek spiritual counsel from clergy 
members without any knowledge of the clergy-penitent privilege84 
gravely underestimate how quickly most religious communities 
would communicate the fact that Father Jones or Pastor Green has 
been subpoenaed to testify or imprisoned.85 While the state may suc-
cessfully violate the religious liberties of the first person whose se-
crets it seeks to discover from a clergy member, the remainder of that 
religious community would become acutely aware that the clergy-
penitent privilege has been significantly limited or destroyed.86 
c. Public sentiment.87 In his treatise on evidence, Wigmore hinted 
that lack of public support explains the absence of the clergy-
penitent privilege in English and early American common law.88 
While this may be accurate, nonexistence of the clergy-penitent privi-
lege in a society with few confidential clergy-penitent communica-
tions sheds little light on the current situation. The fact that all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes ensuring 
the place of the clergy-penitent privilege demonstrates public ap-
proval of the privilege.89 Additional public approval of the clergy-
penitent privilege may be found in federal law: the clergy-penitent 
privilege has been recognized “in light of reason and experience”90 in 
federal common law.91 Rather than reflecting public disapproval, the 
 
 83. See infra note 85. 
 84. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 8, at 320–21. 
 85. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 723–24 (discussing case of Pastor John Mellish, a 
Nazarene minister put in jail for refusal to divulge information learned from a confession); 
O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 73, at 1–2. 
 86. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1475 (“[K]nowledge of a privilege may not so 
much encourage communications as knowledge of its absence would deter them. Thus, the 
relevant question is not whether too few people know of a privilege, but whether enough peo-
ple would become aware of (and act on) its absence.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 87. It is unclear why public disapproval would justify non-recognition of a socially bene-
ficial privilege. Thus, the third of Wigmore’s prerequisites may not merit considerable weight 
in comparison with the other three criteria. See supra note 67. 
 88. See WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2396. 
 89. See WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN & JOHN C. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: 
PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 102 (3d ed. 1989). 
 90. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 91. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384–85 (3d Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889–90 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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current threat to the clergy-penitent privilege92 probably stems from 
other, less democratic influences.93 
d. Costs and benefits. The benefits society enjoys from the clergy-
penitent privilege outweigh the limitation it imposes on the state’s 
power to collect evidence. Since gathering empirical evidence to 
support or refute this claim is probably impossible,94 this conclusion 
follows from a few general observations. Although the estimated so-
cial cost of the clergy-penitent privilege is presumably significant,95 
this cost is probably not as great as one might first expect. This is so 
because the cost of a privilege (measured in undiscoverable evidence) 
would not properly include information that would not exist but for 
that privilege.96 Thus, the evidence-gathering panacea in which 
clergy members serve the state as informants is imagined; the cost 
imposed on society by the clergy-penitent privilege consists only of 
information that would be volunteered to clergy in the absence of 
the clergy-penitent privilege. 
Balanced against these costs, the sustained legitimacy and emi-
nently positive social behavior that the state derives from the clergy-
penitent privilege carry considerable weight. Perhaps more than any 
other privilege, the clergy-penitent privilege protects communica-
tions that are likely to be withheld from the state even in the face of 
serious legal consequences. One author illustrates this situation by 
alluding to Antigone’s decision to simultaneously obey the gods and 
disobey King Creon.97 In such circumstances, attempts to compel 
 
 92. See supra Part I. 
 93. See infra Part IV. 
 94. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1474 (pointing out that “no solid empirical data 
exists to support the estimates of either critics or proponents as to either the costs or the bene-
fits of privileges”). This lack of empirical evidence on either side is likely to persist due to the 
presumably insurmountable difficulty inherent in proving the non-occurrence of an event: “the 
extent to which people would communicate in the absence of the privilege.” Id. at 1477. 
 95. Wigmore hinted at the potential costs imposed on society by evidentiary privileges 
when he stated that “[t]he whole life of the community, the regularity and continuity of its 
relations, depends upon the coming of the witness.” WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2192. 
 96. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1477 (“Because at least some evidence pre-
sumably exists only because a privilege encouraged its creation, the unavailability of such evi-
dence cannot properly be deemed a cost of having the privilege.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 97. Whitaker, supra note 82, at 168. “Nor did I deem that your decrees were of such 
force that a mortal could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven. For their life 
is not of today or yesterday, but from all time . . . .” Id. (quoting SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in 
THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES 119 (Sir Richard Claverhous Jebb trans., Moses Hadas 
ed. 1967)) . 
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clergy to reveal the content of confidential communications may lead 
to highly visible spectacles of clergy imprisonment98 without actually 
providing more evidence available to society. Standing alone, the will 
to defy a legal requirement on the part of some members of society 
does not justify an exception to that requirement. However, when 
imposing specific duties, the state must consider its general ability to 
ensure compliance. In addition to broad public disapproval, episodes 
of clergy imprisonment may cause public doubts about the state’s 
ability to compel compliance to rules of evidence.99 Such disapproval 
and doubts may diminish the state’s ability to operate in other less 
controversial areas.100 Therefore, by maintaining the clergy-penitent 
privilege, the state sustains its own legitimacy. 
Society also benefits from the clergy-penitent privilege as indi-
viduals improve their lives in the process of confidential confession 
and similar spiritual counseling with clergy. When effective, such 
confession and counseling instills in penitents a sense of responsibil-
ity, provides penitents with the encouragement to abandon behavior 
that is condemned by church and state alike, and in the process, im-
parts moral understanding that leaves penitents better than they were 
before committing the acts that caused them to seek clergy assistance 
in the first place.101 Confidential confession or counseling with clergy 
may be particularly effective because people longing to improve their 
behavior willfully submit themselves to it (rather than being com-
pelled as in the case of state-imposed rehabilitation). Confidential 
confession or counseling may also be particularly effective because it 
motivates penitents through reference to deeply held religious beliefs 
and the related moral imperatives—a means of motivating desirable 
behavior generally not available to the state. Thus, to the extent that 
confidential confession and counseling lead people to overcome abu-
sive behavior, the clergy-penitent privilege is consistent with the goal 
 
 98. See supra note 85. 
 99. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1498–1500. (“According to the image theory, 
courts and legislatures have established the existing set of privileges because they minimize pos-
sible embarrassment to the legal system.”). Id. at 1498–99. 
 100. See id. 
 101. This sentence reflects the goals of confidential communications between clergy and 
penitents in general. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of clergy-
penitent communications. Furthermore, any state evaluation as to the effectiveness of clergy-
penitent relation would presumably be suspect. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 765. (“[C]ourts 
are . . . unqualified and in principle disqualified from establishing criteria to assess the quality 
of clergy-confider consultations.”). Id. 
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of preventing child abuse.102 The cumulative result of many people’s 
efforts to overcome their harmful behavior through confidential 
communications with clergy will naturally translate into broad social 
benefits. 
Contrary to these conclusions, some may argue that abuse-
reporting laws generate more utility than does preserving the clergy-
penitent privilege. While successful efforts to preserve child health 
and safety103 would provide significant and tangible benefits to soci-
ety, the question remains whether abrogation of the clergy-penitent 
privilege is necessary to protect children. Traditional methods of law 
enforcement remain intact for the enforcement of child abuse laws. 
Reporting requirements that are less controversial and arguably more 
appropriate for their purpose, such as those requiring physicians to 
report,104 also remain intact. To claim that abrogation of the clergy-
penitent privilege generates more utility than preservation of that 
privilege also assumes that such abrogation is an effective means of 
gathering information about abuse. Although it is not possible to 
prove one way or the other,105 abrogation of the clergy-penitent 
privilege is probably not an effective means of gathering information 
about abuse for two reasons. First, even facing imprisonment, many 
religious leaders are not likely to disclose confidential information 
learned in confession or similar counseling.106 Second, abrogation of 
the clergy-penitent privilege through an abuse-reporting law will al-
most certainly deter potential abusers from confessing.107 Thus, the 
benefits society derives from the preservation of the clergy-penitent 
privilege outweigh any benefits that might be derived from abroga-
tion of that privilege. 
2. Utility and the attorney-client privilege 
a. Confidentiality. As with the clergy-penitent privilege, rules of 
confidentiality support the expectation of confidentiality in an attor-
ney-client relationship. Rules of professional conduct impose on at-
 
 102. See O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 73, at 51 (“The child’s best interest may actu-
ally be furthered by maintaining the privilege. Thus, there is a false conflict between the state’s 
goal and the religious practice because both can work toward the same end.”). 
 103. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 105. See supra note 94. 
 106. See supra notes 82–83, 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra note 81; infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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torneys a duty not to disclose a client’s “confidential information.”108 
In addition, these rules provide that attorneys who violate the duty 
of confidentiality shall be subject to discipline.109 Although sup-
ported by rules of professional conduct, the expectation of confiden-
tiality is far from unlimited in the attorney-client relationship. The 
attorney-client privilege protects the communications of those seek-
ing legal advice with the intent to comply with the law.110 As far as it 
functions correctly, the crime-fraud exception111 ensures that the at-
torney-client privilege does not create a shield for those who seek le-
gal advice to determine whether an illegal plot is likely to succeed. 
The privilege may also be waived through disclosure.112 In addition, 
it is important to note that some information protected by the privi-
lege may be discovered from sources other than the attorney or cli-
ent.113 
b. Is confidentiality essential? Similar to the clergy-penitent privi-
lege, confidentiality is “essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relation”114 between attorney and client. The attorney-
client privilege encourages individuals who are uncertain about the 
legality of their actions to seek legal advice. If such uncertain indi-
viduals anticipate that their attorney will be compelled to reveal the 
content of client consultations, these individuals are more likely to 
act without consultation.115 Such diminished consultation could sig-
nificantly limit the effectiveness of an attorney-client relationship. 
 
 108. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4-101 (1995); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1995). 
 109. See supra note 108. 
 110. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1507 (“[T]he attorney-client privilege protects 
the client’s ability to pursue his own goals within the confines of the law.”). 
 111. The attorney-client privilege does not cover communications regarding future or 
ongoing crimes or frauds. See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(stating reasons for the attorney-client privilege “are completely eviscerated when a client con-
sults an attorney not for advice on past misconduct, but for legal assistance in carrying out a 
contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud”). 
 112. The attorney-client privilege may be waived by any disclosure of privileged informa-
tion. See United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979) (waiving privilege when 
attorney gave information acquired from client to government); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 
976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (waiving privilege even though disclosure was inadvertent). 
 113. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1479. 
 114. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2285; see also supra text accompanying note 67. 
 115. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 898 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1990) (interfering with 
the privilege “will have a grave effect on our justice system as clients, knowing that their confi-
dential communications may be subject to disclosure, will eventually be less than candid with 
their attorneys or will consider foregoing legal advice altogether”). 
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The partial or complete abrogation of the attorney-client privilege 
would also cause a potential chilling of attorney tenacity.116 Without 
the protection of a privilege, attorneys would be forced to balance 
conflicting duties: the duty to obtain complete information, which 
may involve considerable effort on the part of the attorney, and the 
duty to testify about client communications in court.117 These con-
flicting duties may lead attorneys to obtain less than complete infor-
mation from their clients—another situation that would constitute a 
degradation of the attorney-client relationship. 
c. Public sentiment. Popular support for the attorney-client privi-
lege may be inferred from its sustained existence in state and federal 
law. Since its recognition as a common-law principle, the attorney-
client privilege has played a significant role in state law.118 The attor-
ney-client privilege was also recognized early and interpreted broadly 
in federal courts.119 Still, the 1972 decision of Congress to reject the 
proposed version of Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence120 
highlights the tension between attorney self-interest and popular 
support for the attorney-client privilege. A major concern of the op-
ponents to the eventually rejected version of Article V was that the 
advisory committee (a drafting body composed entirely of attorneys) 
had conceived of an extensive attorney-client privilege while giving 
minimal attention to other privileges and failing to even mention 
privileges for some professions that had previously been protected.121 
Rather than approve this system, Congress provided that evidentiary 
privileges would “be governed by the principles of the common law 
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light 
of reason and experience.”122 
d. Costs and benefits. The societal benefits derived from the at-
torney-client privilege outweigh the costs it imposes. Since it cannot 
 
 116. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1476–77. 
 117. See Id. 
 118. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1069–91 (1978). 
 119. See, e.g., Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826) (“The general 
rule is not disputed, that confidential communications between client and attorney, are not to 
be revealed at any time.”). 
 120. See generally MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 
501.1–513.1 (4th ed. 1996). 
 121. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1468–69. 
 122. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
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be established or refuted by empirical evidence,123 a few observations 
will demonstrate this point. The costs associated with the attorney-
client privilege may be reasonably characterized as substantial.124 
However, as with the clergy-penitent privilege, this cost is not as 
great as it may at first seem.125 The benefits generally considered to 
outweigh the cost of unavailable evidence refer to the role of attor-
neys in ensuring the effective operation of the United States legal 
system. This rationale has been stated in various ways. In Ford Motor 
Co. v. Leggat,126 the Supreme Court of Texas stated that “[t]he pur-
pose of the privilege is to ensure the free flow of information be-
tween attorney and client, ultimately serving the broader societal in-
terest of effective administration of justice.”127 The effective 
operation of the legal system is presumably what the Supreme Court 
had in mind in Upjohn Co. v. United States128 when it reasoned that 
“sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and . . . such ad-
vice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by 
the client.”129 For better or worse, the prevailing “instrumental” un-
derstanding of attorneys in the adversarial system may increase the 
significance of the attorney-client privilege. The instrumental view of 
attorneys asserts that the legal system functions best when attorneys 
pursue stated client interests without concern for related moral or 
social implications.130 Thus, the attorney-client privilege is a neces-
sary condition for an attorney to function as a fully zealous instru-
ment in the hands of a client. 
 
 123. See supra note 94. 
 124. See supra note 95. 
 125. See supra note 96; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (“Ap-
plication of the attorney-client privilege . . . puts the adversary in no worse position than if the 
communications had never taken place.”); Developments, supra note 68, at 1507–08 (“[T]o 
the extent that the privilege induces a client to reveal information to his attorney, it keeps from 
the court only sources of information that would not exist without the privilege.”). 
 126. 904 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1995). 
 127. Id. at 647 (citations omitted). 
 128. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 129. Id. at 389. 
 130. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 122–24 (1993). “The narrow view 
insists that a lawyer is merely a specialized tool for effecting his client’s desires. It assumes that 
the client comes to his lawyer with a fixed objective in mind. The lawyer then has two, and 
only two, responsibilities: first, to supply his client with information concerning the legal con-
sequences of his actions, and second, to implement whatever decision the client makes, so long 
as it is lawful.” Id. at 123. 
BAI-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
489] How Secrets Are Kept 
 511 
3. What analysis under the utilitarian framework reveals 
Under the test proposed by Wigmore, some similarly compelling 
grounds justify the legal recognition of the clergy-penitent and at-
torney-client privileges. Communications between clergy and peni-
tents and attorneys and clients are both accompanied by a significant 
expectation of confidentiality.131 Also, forcing either an attorney or a 
member of the clergy to act as an informant for the state would be 
likely to render “full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation be-
tween the parties” impossible.132 In addition, public support of these 
privileges can be inferred from their continued existence in state and 
federal law.133 While both privileges merit preservation due to the 
significant social benefits they provide, a side-by-side comparison of 
these benefits reveals that their value to society is not identical. 
The heightened value of the social utility provided by the clergy-
penitent privilege may be appreciated in light of a simple hypotheti-
cal. Assume an individual consults both an attorney and a member of 
the clergy regarding behavior that is both legally and morally sus-
pect. While the attorney will address the client’s legal concerns, the 
member of the clergy will address the moral or spiritual well-being of 
the penitent. Although the attorney will facilitate an efficient and fair 
disposition of any legal problems, she is not likely to concern herself 
with the underlying causes of the behavior that made legal represen-
tation necessary in the first place. In contrast, the cleric specifically 
addresses the underlying causes to help the penitent overcome them. 
To state the point differently, resolution of legal problems, although 
important, should not be valued above a lasting moral change in an 
individual that may prevent many (potentially more serious) legal 
problems in the future. 
Since the clergy-penitent privilege’s justification under Wig-
more’s analysis is stronger than that generally asserted in defense of 
the attorney-client privilege, the current difference in status between 
the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privileges cannot be explained 
on utilitarian grounds. The hypothetical referred to above could in-
 
 131. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the clergy member’s duty of confidentiality, 
based on a God-ordained rule, is not exactly comparable to professional codes of ethics. See 
supra notes 70–76, 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 132. WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 2285; see supra Parts II.A.1.b and II.A.2.b.; see also 
supra text accompanying note 67. 
 133. See supra Parts II.A.1.c and II.A.2.c. 
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volve an individual who fears that his behavior constitutes abuse. If 
such an individual had the misfortune of living in a state that had si-
multaneously abrogated the clergy-penitent privilege and maintained 
the attorney-client privilege, he would be placed in a precarious posi-
tion.134 The absurdity of providing for the solution of legal problems, 
but not the underlying causes of harmful behavior, highlights the 
grave fallacy of the current attack on the clergy-penitent privilege. 
B. You Have the (Privacy) Right to Remain Silent 
Some authors have argued that evidentiary privileges are justified 
because an individual right to privacy makes forced disclosure of con-
fidential communications morally wrong regardless of the benefits to 
society.135 One author describes evidentiary privileges under a rights 
regime as “a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom . . . 
from the state’s coercive or supervisory powers.”136 Despite these ar-
guments, courts have been reluctant to adopt the privacy rationale 
for evidentiary privileges.137 The privacy rationale’s apparent threat to 
the status quo under the utilitarian rationale may explain this reluc-
tance. Another possible explanation is that the privacy rationale does 
not avoid the problems of the utilitarian rationale, the claims of some 
authors138 notwithstanding. This is so because the judicial preserva-
tion of a privilege on privacy grounds still requires a judge to balance 
the individual’s privacy interest against the societal interest in obtain-
ing evidence.139 Either way, the privacy rationale’s underlying argu-
 
 134. See Mosteller, supra note 39, at 266: 
The folly of preferential treatment for attorneys may readily be seen by imagining a 
scenario in which a lawyer has secured the confidential admission of her client re-
garding past abuse. She wishes to advise the client to seek treatment in hopes of pre-
venting future abuse, but understands that any other professional to whom the cli-
ent is referred will be required to report the prior conduct if disclosed during 
therapy. In that situation, preserving the privilege for the lawyer alone has limited 
utility and little theoretical cogency. 
 135. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Al-
ternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 89 (1973) (“[I]t is not a 
farfetched view that personal evidentiary privileges go to the heart of the modern American 
citizen’s need for a right of privacy.”); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and 
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956). 
 136. Louisell, supra note 135, at 110–11. 
 137. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 72. 
 138. See Louisell, supra note 135, at 111 (claiming that the Wigmore prerequisites lead 
to conclusions that are “sometimes highly conjectural and defy scientific validation”). 
 139. See Developments, supra note 68, at 1482–83. “Because of this balancing, the privacy 
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ment remains persuasive because it elevates the discussion of confi-
dential communications to individual and group rights to meet the 
challenge of increasing government interference. Since the privacy 
rationale’s inherent persuasiveness may lead it to provide the basis for 
future legislation or judicial decisions, it merits consideration in rela-
tion to the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges. 
Since they both concern activities that are highly personal, the 
clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges appear to satisfy the 
fundamental requirement for protection under the privacy rationale. 
However, the strength of the privacy rationale for the clergy-penitent 
or attorney-client privileges may be distinguished by the nature of 
the communications they protect. When an individual seeks legal ad-
vice, she seeks to obtain knowledge regarding her legal relation to 
the state or other individuals.140 Thus, confidential attorney-client 
communications allow individuals to order their legal relations with-
out surrendering to the state or other individuals a significant advan-
tage. In contrast, an individual seeks to confess to a member of the 
clergy due to concern for her relationship with God. Thus, confiden-
tial clergy-penitent communications allow individuals to order their 
spiritual lives without state interference. The state must concern itself 
with its legal relation to individual citizens and the legal relations of 
its individual citizens. Therefore, the attorney-client privilege creates 
privacy in an area of public concern. Since the state has no interest in 
regulating an individual’s relationship with God, the clergy-penitent 
privilege maintains privacy in an eminently private area. Whereas it 
protects an activity that is inherently more private, the clergy-
penitent privilege claims stronger support from the privacy rationale 
than does the attorney-client privilege. Thus, the privacy rationale 
does not justify the trend of abrogation of the clergy-penitent privi-
lege and preservation of the attorney-client privilege. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 
Supreme Court acknowledgement of a constitutional basis for 
the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privileges remains limited. 
Still, consideration of the clergy-penitent and attorney-client privi-
 
rationale is just as indeterminate as the traditional [utilitarian] justification.” Id. at 1483. 
 140. See Charles Fried, Correspondence, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 586 
(1977) (arguing that it is “immoral for society to constrain anyone from discovering what the 
limits of its power over him are”). 
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leges in light of the Constitution of the United States provides an-
other useful framework for the evaluation of the current status of 
these privileges in relation to abuse-reporting laws. 
A. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege and the Religion Clauses 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Re-
ligion Clauses of the First Amendment141 protect the clergy-penitent 
privilege from state interference, it has expressed significant approval 
of the privilege in several opinions.142 The following provides an 
overview of the arguments that should persuade the Court to protect 
the clergy-penitent privilege under the First Amendment. 
1. The Free Exercise Clause 
Whether the Free Exercise Clause requires the existence of the 
clergy-penitent privilege may hinge on the test articulated in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith.143 Under Smith, a particular law does not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause if it is a “valid and neutral law of 
general applicability.”144 Abuse-reporting laws that impose either a 
universal145 or otherwise very broad duty to report would probably 
be upheld under Smith’s neutral and general applicability require-
ments. However, the lack of neutrality and general applicability of 
abuse-reporting laws that single out clergy as mandatory reporters 
while maintaining the confidentiality of other comparable communi-
cations146 may be found to violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
Under Smith, the Supreme Court may still be compelled to apply 
 
 141. The First Amendment states in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion . . . or abridging the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 142. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The priest-penitent 
privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute 
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation 
and guidance in return.”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“[G]enerally, 
an attorney or a priest may not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional 
confidence.”); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (“[P]ublic policy forbids the 
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the dis-
closure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential . . . suits cannot be maintained 
which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional.”). 
 143. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 144. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
 146. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
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the Free Exercise test first articulated in Sherbert v. Verner147 if a Free 
Exercise claim is combined with a claim based on another constitu-
tional right.148 Possible “hybrid”149 claims could combine a Free Ex-
ercise claim with claims under the First Amendment’s free speech 
and association provisions or the Fourteenth Amendment’s protec-
tion of liberty under the Due Process Clause.150 In Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees,151 the Supreme Court declared that “a corresponding 
right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, 
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends”152 is im-
plicit in the First Amendment. Under the Roberts analysis,153 clergy 
members and penitents arguably engage in expressive association 
through the clergy-penitent relationship.154 Since it is likely to de-
grade or completely deter confession,155 abrogation of the clergy-
penitent privilege probably constitutes a violation of the right to ex-
pressive association. The Supreme Court may also find a liberty in-
terest in clergy-penitent communications that merits protection un-
der the Due Process Clause. Summarizing decades of jurisprudence, 
the Court declared that substantive due process protection is af-
forded to rights and interests that are both “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition”156 and carefully described.157 While 
 
 147. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 148. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 149. Id. at 882. 
 150. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part: “nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1. 
 151. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 152. Id. at 622. 
 153. To determine if a group is protected by the right recognized in Roberts, the Court 
first determines if the group engages in “expressive association.” See Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). This right “is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come 
within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or pri-
vate.” Id. Second, the Court analyzed the facts to determine if the challenged state action vio-
lated the right to expressive association. Id. at 650–56. The Roberts court defined violation of 
the right of expressive association as “intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an asso-
ciation.” 468 U.S. at 623. 
 154. For example, in Christ-centered religions, confession and similar counseling involves 
expression of beliefs regarding the need to repent and the possibility of one’s sins being for-
given through Jesus Christ. 
 155. See supra note 81; infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 157. See id. at 721. 
BAI-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
516 
careful description should pose no problem, the clergy-penitent 
privilege’s undisputed place in American history and tradition158 
should ensure its protection under the Due Process Clause. 
If the Court were to acknowledge that abrogation of the clergy-
penitent privilege provides a basis for a valid hybrid claim, it would 
proceed to ask whether the law in question imposed an undue “bur-
den” on the free exercise of religion, whether the law was justified by 
a “compelling state interest,” and whether it used the least restrictive 
means available to achieve that interest.159 Under the Sherbert test, 
the claimant would rely on specific religious teachings or rules160 to 
demonstrate the religious significance of confession or similar spiri-
tual counseling in the church involved. The Court is likely to ac-
knowledge the existence of a religious belief when an individual has 
confessed sins to a clergy member believing such confession had reli-
gious significance. Next, the claimant would present evidence 
regarding diminution of trust between clergy and penitents and the 
resulting deterrence of confession161 to demonstrate that abrogation 
of the clergy-penitent privilege has imposed a significant burden on 
religious belief. The Court is likely to acknowledge that actual deter-
rence of confession “impede[s] the observance of one or all relig-
ions”162 and therefore constitutes a significant burden on the Free 
Exercise of religion. 
Since child abuse is a serious problem in the United States,163 
child abuse prevention is undoubtedly a compelling state interest. At 
this point however, the question remains for the Court whether this 
state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify interference with the 
clergy-penitent privilege. The Court’s characterization of the reli-
 
 158. This Comment has touched only briefly on the history of the clergy-penitent privi-
lege (see supra notes 88–91). For a comprehensive treatment of the clergy-penitent privilege’s 
history, see Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1983). 
 159. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406–07; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972). 
 160. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 161. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1530 (1997) (The court stated that 
“knowledge, belief, or suspicion that freely-confessed sins would become public would operate 
as a serious deterrent to participation in the sacrament and an odious detriment accompanying 
participation [by penitent]. When the prosecutor asserts the right to tape the sacrament he not 
only intrudes upon the confession taped but . . . he invades their free exercise of religion.”). 
 162. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 
(1961)). 
 163. See supra note 10. 
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gious and governmental interests under consideration may determine 
the outcome of this part of the analysis.164 If the Court avoids tilting 
the scales in either direction,165 the outcome of this balancing test 
could conceivably go either way. Of course, identification of a com-
pelling government interest does not end the analysis. Before engag-
ing in a full least-restrictive-means analysis, the Court should deter-
mine whether the means employed by the state are viable at all.166 In 
the case at hand, the Court should ask whether abrogation of the 
clergy-penitent privilege merits consideration as a viable “means” of 
preventing child abuse.167 Since it is impossible to prove that abroga-
tion of the clergy-penitent privilege will prevent child abuse,168 the 
Court should not simply assume that abrogation achieves such an 
outcome. Instead, the Court could be persuaded at this point that 
abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege is an ineffective169 or 
counterproductive means170 of protecting children or that alternative 
means exist to ensure child health and safety.171 If it were to deter-
mine for any of these reasons that the abrogation of the clergy-
penitent privilege is not a viable means to achieve the state’s purpose, 
the Court would probably conclude that the Free Exercise Clause 
requires the continued existence of the clergy-penitent privilege. 
While the Court could adopt the preceding argument, some authors 
have discussed plausible ways in which the Court could fail to afford 
such protection to the clergy-penitent privilege under the Free Exer-
 
 164. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 807–10. 
 165. See id. at 808. Mitchell points out that the issue could be framed “as a balancing of 
the cleric’s right to keep secrets” against the state’s interest “in protecting abused children.” 
Id. Similarly, the issue could be framed as a balancing between a “cleric’s right to the free exer-
cise of religion” and a state’s interest in pursuing one of many law enforcement strategies. Id. 
 166. See id. at 810–18. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 811–15. 
Here Mitchell argues that clergy have “a good argument that the state stands to gain no addi-
tional information from requiring objecting clergy to report.” Mitchell, supra note 17,  at 812. 
 170. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 818 
(“[M]andating clergy reports is counterproductive to the state’s goal of protecting children. If 
the prospect of disclosure will deter people from approaching clergy for help, the choice is not 
between help from the state and help from clergy, it is between help from clergy and no help at 
all. By discouraging persons from seeking private help, reporting requirements may preclude 
some troubled people from seeking any help at all.”) (citations omitted). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 104; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 815–16 (“Other 
persons, for example, are required to report suspected cases of child abuse and can do so with-
out offense to their religious beliefs.”). 
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cise Clause and the compelling government interest/least-restrictive-
means test.172 
The possibility (under either Smith or Sherbert) that the Consti-
tution does not prohibit forcing clergy to choose between working 
as state informants and imprisonment demonstrates the inadequacy 
of the jurisprudential tests that the Supreme Court has superimposed 
on the Free Exercise Clause. The situation at hand demonstrates 
how these tests function like crude simplifications, providing states 
with simple formulas (legislate in general terms or identify a compel-
ling government interest) guaranteed to insulate legislation from 
Free Exercise scrutiny. In contrast to the current situation, the Phil-
lips court in 1813173 recognized, consistent with the Founders’ un-
derstanding of the words “free exercise of religion,”174 that the First 
Amendment guaranteed state accommodation of the clergy-penitent 
privilege. As Professor McConnell points out, the language of the 
First Amendment was informed by the founding generation’s inter-
est in freedom to worship and not just freedom from state-imposed 
worship.175 This understanding of the phrase “free exercise of relig-
ion” supports constitutionally mandated maintenance of the clergy-
penitent privilege today. The Court may not avoid ruling on the 
constitutionality of the clergy-penitent privilege forever. Forced to 
deal with the constitutionality of the clergy-penitent privilege, the 
Supreme Court would have an opportunity to devise an analysis 
based on the historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause; an 
analysis that requires lawmakers on every level to do more than seek 
 
 172. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 11, at 985–95; Ronald J. Columbo, Forgive Us Our Sins: 
The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 235–36 (1998). 
 173. See supra notes 1, 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 174. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1512: 
[T]he evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinning of the free exercise clause, 
best reflected in Madison’s writings, is that the claims of the “universal sovereign” 
precede the claims of civil society, both in time and in authority, and that when the 
people vested power in the government over civil affairs, they necessarily reserved 
their unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, in accordance with the dictates 
of conscience. Under this understanding, the right of free exercise is defined in the 
first instance not by the nature and scope of the laws, but by nature and scope of re-
ligious duty. A religious duty does not cease to be a religious duty merely because 
the legislature has passed a generally applicable law making compliance difficult or 
impossible. 
 175. See id. at 1516–17 (concluding that the understanding that Free Exercise guaran-
teed “the freedom to follow religious dogma” distinguished the understanding of those “who 
provided the political muscle for religious freedom in America” from Locke and Jefferson’s 
enlightenment understanding of Free Exercise). 
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the shelter from Free Exercise scrutiny that Smith or even Sherbert 
provide. 
2. The Establishment Clause 
At first glance, state abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege 
may seem to raise only Free Exercise issues. However, since it consti-
tutes government interference with church autonomy, such abroga-
tion also raises serious Establishment Clause issues. According to 
Professor Esbeck, the Establishment Clause is best understood as a 
structural restraint on government interference in areas that are re-
served exclusively to religion.176 Among many other arguments in 
support of his thesis,177 Professor Esbeck demonstrates how the Su-
preme Court has applied the Establishment Clause as a structural re-
straint on government power.178 For example, the Court exempted 
parochial schools from compliance when unemployment compensa-
tion taxes and mandatory collective bargaining laws would have in-
terfered with church autonomy as it relates to employment prac-
tices.179 While it would not change the outcome of many 
Establishment Clause claims, this understanding would affect cases in 
which state regulation imposes a burden on church autonomy.180 
Thus, the current analysis would consist of determining whether 
abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege would amount to a state 
intrusion into the “sphere of autonomy”181 reserved for religion by 
the Establishment Clause. In general terms, this sphere of autonomy 
includes “ecclesiastical governance, the resolution of doctrine, the 
 
 176. See Esbeck, supra note 7, at 10–11. 
 177. For example, Esbeck argues that the Court’s relaxation of standing requirements in 
Establishment Clause cases illustrates that the central concern in such cases is not the vindica-
tion of individual religious rights, but limitation of government intrusion into areas reserved 
exclusively for church action. See id. at 33–40. Esbeck’s other supporting arguments relate to 
remedies (see id. at 40–42), church autonomy (see id. at 42–58), and the nondelegation rule 
(see id. at 58–60). 
 178. See id. at 44–45 (citing cases to demonstrate that the court has identified at least 
four categories of government activity that the Establishment Clause forbids). 
 179. See id at 78–79 (citing St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 
451 U.S. 772, 780–81 (1981) (regarding unemployment taxes) and NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (regarding mandatory collective bargaining laws)). 
 180. See id. at 77 (“[R]egulatory burdens that touch on matters in the religious do-
main . . . violate no-establishment. This is so, not as a matter of group or associational rights, 
but as a matter of government exceeding its jurisdiction as limited by the Establishment 
Clause.”). 
 181. Id. 
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composing of prayers, and the teaching of religion.”182 “[T]he ad-
mission, guidance, expected moral behavior, and excommunication 
of church members,”183 a specific area within this sphere, is particu-
larly relevant in relation to the question at hand. For many, confes-
sion is an ordinance, or is closely related to sacramental ordinances, 
of the highest religious significance.184 Confession or similar spiritual 
counseling also involves significant religious instruction.185 Beyond 
this, confession of certain sins can result in church disciplinary action, 
such as excommunication.186 Since abrogation of the clergy-penitent 
privilege will deter confession,187 it would necessarily interfere with 
church autonomy as it relates to religious ordinances, instruction, 
and church disciplinary action. Accepting Esbeck’s thesis, the Estab-
lishment Clause would not tolerate this outcome. Although unneces-
sary under the structural restraint analysis, this conclusion can be 
stated in the terms of the generally acknowledged Establishment 
Clause test.188 Thus, even if based on a secular purpose, abrogation 
of the clergy-penitent privilege would clearly inhibit religion while 
increasing government entanglement in the areas of religious ordi-
nances, instruction, and church disciplinary action. Forced to rule on 
the issue, the Court arguably should acknowledge under the struc-
tural restraint analysis—or at least Lemon—that the Establishment 
Clause limits the power of the state to interfere with the clergy-
penitent privilege. 
 
 
 
 
 182. Id. at 10–11. 
 183. Id. at 45 n.175 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871) for the 
proposition that “there is no court jurisdiction as to church discipline or the conformity of 
members to the standard of morals required of them”). 
 184. For example, Roman Catholics consider confession a necessary ordinance, while 
confession for members of the LDS church is part of a repentance process that requires the 
observance of a separate ordinance (the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper) to receive forgiveness 
for sins. 
 185. See supra note 154. 
 186. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 81 and 161 and accompanying text. 
 188. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971), the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a law does not violate the Establishment Clause if: (1) it is based on a “secular leg-
islative purpose”; (2) its effect “neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) it does not en-
tail “excessive government entanglement with religion.” 
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B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
One author has observed that “[a]lthough often associated with 
constitutional rights . . . most of the breadth and sweep of the attor-
ney-client privilege is without constitutional protection.”189 In Fisher 
v. United States,190 the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amend-
ment right against compelled self-incrimination191 does not prevent 
the state from compelling an attorney to divulge confidential client 
information.192 The Fisher court reasoned that requiring an attorney 
to reveal information that the client voluntarily gave to the attorney 
did not compel the accused in any way.193 Furthermore, the Fisher 
court determined that documents compelled from an attorney “con-
tain[ed] no testimonial declarations” by the accused and therefore 
failed to qualify under another key aspect of the Fifth Amendment’s 
right against compelled self-incrimination.194 In contrast, the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel195 is generally 
taken to require some degree of confidential consultation with an at-
torney.196 Still, the Supreme Court has not provided much detail re-
garding the scope of the privilege required by the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment’s coverage 
is limited: it applies only to criminal proceedings and only after the 
formal accusation of a suspect.197 Therefore, except in the case of 
formally accused criminal defendants, the Constitution does not pre-
vent legislative limitation of the attorney-client privilege.198 
 
 189. Mosteller, supra note 39, at 269. For a more in-depth treatment of the constitu-
tional status of the attorney-client privilege, see Mosteller, supra note 39, at 269–72. 
 190. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 191. The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: “[no person] shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 192. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402. 
 193. Id. at 397. 
  194. Id. at 409. 
 195. The Sixth Amendment states in relevant part: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 196. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications between 
the accused and his attorney.”); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 552 (1977). 
 197. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986) (stating that the right to effective 
assistance of counsel only applies after the initiation of adversarial proceedings); Kirby v. Illi-
nois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–89 (1972) (stating that the right to effective assistance of counsel 
applies only when judicial proceedings have been initiated by “formal charge, preliminary hear-
ing, indictment, information, or arraignment”). 
 198. See Mosteller, supra note 39, at 272 (concluding that “[t]he attorney client privilege 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION 
While nothing in the preceding constitutional analysis justifies 
the current situation, the arguments in support of the clergy-penitent 
privilege199 suggest that it merits more constitutional protection than 
does the attorney-client privilege. Similarly, since it provides greater 
social utility200 while protecting an inherently more private inter-
est,201 the clergy-penitent privilege should, if anything, hold a 
stronger position than the attorney-client privilege in the laws of the 
several states. Since the current trend contradicts all of these conclu-
sions, it is necessary to look beyond the traditional rationales and 
constitutional arguments to consider alternative explanations for the 
current situation. 
A. Attorney Self-Interest 
The difference in status between the clergy-penitent and attor-
ney-client privileges may be explained by the fact that judges and 
many legislators are attorneys.202 In one sense, this is neither contro-
versial nor surprising. Education and livelihood in the law should 
compel lawyers to protect a privilege that is probably essential to the 
sound operation of the legal system.203 The influence of attorney self-
interest is not confined to the law of evidentiary privileges; such in-
fluence probably accounts for the rule that attorneys are paid first in 
bankruptcy proceedings,204 or the unusually high standards of proof 
applied in attorney malpractice cases.205 Like the attorney-client privi-
lege, these legal rules are probably justified by legitimate concerns. 
However, attorney self-interest becomes a problem if it leads to the 
neglect of other important interests. One can easily imagine how 
such neglect may account for the destruction of the clergy-penitent  
 
as it applies to reporting of child abuse . . . depends largely upon the good judgment of legisla-
tures and their determination of sound social policy”). 
 199. See supra Part III.A. 
 200. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 201. See supra Part II.B. 
 202. See 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5472 (1986) (discussing attorney self-interest and the attorney-client 
privilege). 
 203. See supra Part II.A.2.d. 
 204. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 7-11 (1993). 
 205. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 266 (9th ed. 1994). 
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privilege. Attorneys engaged in lawmaking may simply put forth 
more effort to protect the attorney-client privilege than the clergy-
penitent privilege. To such attorneys, challenges to the attorney-
client privilege probably seem much more urgent than challenges to 
clergy-penitent privilege. And faced with pressure to abrogate evi-
dentiary privileges in the legislative process, such attorneys may re-
spond by sacrificing the clergy-penitent privilege (among others) so 
long as the attorney-client privilege is maintained. Since many of the 
clergy-penitent privilege’s beneficiaries are not entrusted with mak-
ing and applying the law, those who are so entrusted should concern 
themselves more with the preservation of the clergy-penitent privi-
lege. 
B. Legislation That Appears to Help 
Another explanation for the status of the clergy-penitent and 
attorney-client privileges in relation to abuse-reporting laws is the 
temptation to legislate in broad strokes when faced with a problem 
like child abuse. Dealing with child abuse on the state level raises dif-
ficult questions about how a state may pursue the interests of chil-
dren while not impeding private institutions (families, churches, 
therapists, etc.) that are probably much better suited to care for chil-
dren. Rather than address this question, abuse-reporting laws rely on 
the troubling presumption that the state must get involved. This is 
troubling because clergy-penitent communications may diminish 
child abuse.206 Thus, legislators truly concerned about child-abuse 
prevention should be cautious about interfering with clergy-penitent 
communications—and should be suspicious of any claim that abro-
gation of the clergy-penitent privilege will actually prevent child 
abuse.207 Absent other justifications to interfere with long-established 
privileges, it is conceivable that such legislators are motivated by a 
desire to appear “tough on crime.” After all, from the standpoint of 
one seeking reelection, the actual effect of a law may seem less im-
portant than how voters perceive the legislator’s intentions. 
 
 
 
 
 206. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
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C. Suspect Assumptions About Clergy 
Finally, each decision to abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege 
through an abuse-reporting law implies the judgment that clergy 
members have nothing to contribute in the effort against child 
abuse. Of course, there is no reasonable basis to presume the incom-
petence of clergy or the competence of the state in relation to abuse 
prevention. Much to the contrary, it seems reasonable to presume 
that the bureaucratic machinery of the state will rarely deliver the 
kind of thoughtful, individualized care that clergy provide when vol-
untarily contacted by individuals seeking to improve their lives.208 
Beyond this, starting with a presumption that members of the clergy 
are incompetent to deal with serious problems is comparable to an 
assessment regarding the validity of a religious belief or practice. 
Such assessments have no place in the law.209 The scrutiny that they 
would invite forces express government assessments of religion be-
low the surface of legal rhetoric. For this reason, lawmakers should 
give serious consideration to the unspoken judgments that may lie 
beneath a particular decision to abrogate the clergy-penitent privi-
lege. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the attorney-client privilege remains strong, the clergy-
penitent privilege has been abrogated to a significant degree through 
abuse-reporting laws. This has happened even though constitutional 
arguments and analysis under the traditional justifications for eviden-
tiary privileges suggest that, if anything, the clergy-penitent privilege 
merits more protection than does the attorney-client privilege. The 
Supreme Court should hold that both religion clauses of the First 
Amendment forbid government interference with the clergy-penitent 
privilege. Still, the Supreme Court may fail to live up to the standard 
set by People v. Phillips.210 Regardless, the opportunity to solve the 
problem posed by the attack on the clergy-penitent privilege cur-
rently remains with the states. Attorney self-interest, hollow attempts 
to appear effective, and hostility to religion may explain the current 
 
 208. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text; see also supra note 12. 
 209. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (“[I]t is no business of courts 
to say . . . what is a religious practice or activity.”). 
 210. See supra notes 1, 3–6. 
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situation. State lawmakers should strive to overcome these influences 
as well as any others that prevent them from giving the clergy-
penitent privilege the place it deserves in the law. 
Shawn P. Bailey 
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